Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy

被引：86

作者：

Besley, T ^{[1
]}

Coate, S

机构：

[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

[2] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2001年 / 68卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-937X.00160

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences. On the normative side, coordination failure among lobbyists can result in Pareto inefficient policy choices. In addition, by creating rents to holding office, lobbying can lead to "excessive" entry into electoral competition.

引用

页码：67 / 82

页数：16

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