Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance

被引:407
作者
Licht, Amir N. [1 ]
Goldschmidt, Chanan [1 ]
Schwartz, Shalom H. [2 ]
机构
[1] Interdisciplinary Ctr Herzliya, IL-46150 Herzliyya, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Psychol, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
culture; social institutions; governance; rule of law; corruption; democracy;
D O I
10.1016/j.jce.2007.09.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study presents evidence about relations between national culture and social institutions. We operationalize culture with data on cultural dimensions for some 50 nations adopted from cross-cultural psychology and generate testable hypotheses about three basic social norms of governance: the rule of law, corruption, and democratic accountability. These norms correlate systematically and strongly with national scores on cultural dimensions and also differ across cultural regions of the world. Using a linguistic variable on pronoun drop as an instrument for cultural emphases on autonomy versus embeddedness points to a significant influence of culture on governance. Using cultural profiles of a previous generation as an instrument indicates relative stability of cultural orientations and of their correlates. The results suggest a framework for understanding the relations between fundamental institutions.
引用
收藏
页码:659 / 688
页数:30
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