Risk-sharing networks

被引：85

作者：

Bramoulle, Yann

Kranton, Rachel ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

[2] Univ Laval, Dept Econ, CIRPEE, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

[3] Univ Laval, GREEN, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2007年 / 64卷 / 3-4期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

informal insurance; incomplete risk sharing;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper considers the formation of risk-sharing networks. Following empirical findings, we build a model where pairs form links, but a population cannot coordinate links. As a benchmark, individuals commit to share monetary holdings equally with linked partners. We find efficient networks can (indirectly) connect all individuals and involve full insurance. But equilibrium networks connect fewer individuals. When breaking links, individuals do not consider negative externalities on others in the network. Thus identical individuals can end up in different positions in a network and have different outcomes. These results may help to explain empirical findings that risk-sharing is often asymmetric. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：275 / 294

页数：20

共 18 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2004, INSURANCE POVERTY

[2]

BLOCH F, 2005, INFORMAL INSURANCE S

[3] RECIPROCITY WITHOUT COMMITMENT - CHARACTERIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF INFORMAL INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS [J].