On the spread and impact of anti-dumping

被引:162
作者
Prusa, TJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, Piscataway, NJ 08855 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 2001年 / 34卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/0008-4085.00090
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper two key costs of AD protection are documented. First, once AD has been adopted, countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years 'new' users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD statute a decade ago. Second, I will show that that, on average, AD duties cause the value of imports to fall by 30-50 per cent. I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as for those that result in duties. I also find that, even for those cases that are rejected, imports fall.
引用
收藏
页码:591 / 611
页数:21
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