Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

被引:13
作者
Demougin, D
Fluet, C
机构
[1] Univ Quebec, Montreal, PQ H3C 3P8, Canada
[2] Univ Magdeburg, D-39106 Magdeburg, Germany
关键词
moral hazard; information systems;
D O I
10.1007/PL00004116
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving spread condition on the likelihood ratio distributions.
引用
收藏
页码:489 / 496
页数:8
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