Social norms, tenure security and soil conservation: Evidence from Burundi

被引：33

作者：

Beekman, Gonne ^{[1
]}

Bulte, Erwin H. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wageningen Univ, Dev Econ Grp, POB 8130, NL-6700 EW Wageningen, Netherlands

来源：

AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS | 2012年 / 108卷

关键词：

Erosion control; Tenure security; Customary land rights; Social norms; Institutions; Africa; INVESTMENT INCENTIVES; FIELD EXPERIMENT; CIVIL-WAR; LAND; INSTITUTIONS; CONFLICT; BEHAVIOR; RIGHTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.agsy.2012.01.001

中图分类号：

S [农业科学];

学科分类号：

082806 [农业信息与电气工程];

摘要：

We use a new dataset from war-torn Burundi to explore how various institutional proxies affect investments in soil conservation. We "unbundle" institutions and distinguish between various proxies for tenure security and social norms. While we find significant correlations between certain proxies for tenure and social norms on the one hand, and investments in erosion management on the other, this is not true for all proxies. Using local conflict measures as instruments for institutional quality, we find tentative evidence of a causal effect of tenure security on erosion management, but not on investments improving short-term soil fertility. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：50 / 63

页数：14

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