Countercyclical contingent capital

被引:23
作者
Barucci, Emilio [1 ]
Del Viva, Luca [2 ]
机构
[1] Politecn Milan, Dipartimento Matemat, I-20133 Milan, Italy
[2] Ramon Llull Univ, ESADE Business Sch, Barcelona 08172, Spain
关键词
Countercyclical callable bonds; Convertible bonds; Capital structure; Macroeconomic conditions; Leverage; RISK; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.01.016
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyze the optimal capital structure of a bank issuing countercyclical contingent capital, i.e., notes to be converted into common shares in poor macroeconomic conditions. A comparison of the main effects produced by the countercyclical asset with the simple equity-debt capital structure, the non-countercyclical contingent capital and the countercyclical callable bond is conducted. We demonstrate that this type of asset reduces the spread of straight debt and is effective in reducing the asset substitution incentive. The reduction of bankruptcy costs is strong only when the countercyclicality feature is removed. Contingent capital is useful for macroprudential regulation and we show that the countercyclical feature is important depending on priorities (moderate the asset substitution incentive or reduce bankruptcy costs). (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1688 / 1709
页数:22
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