Common auditors in M&A transactions

被引:234
作者
Cai, Ye [1 ]
Kim, Yongtae [1 ]
Park, Jong Chool [2 ]
White, Hal D. [3 ]
机构
[1] Santa Clara Univ, Leavey Sch Business, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
[2] Old Dominion Univ, Strome Coll Business, Norfolk, VA 23529 USA
[3] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
关键词
Common auditor; Mergers and acquisitions; Uncertainty; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ACCOUNTING QUALITY; SYNERGISTIC GAINS; INVESTMENT BANKS; MARKET REACTION; BIDDING FIRMS; STOCK; ACQUISITIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.01.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
020219 [财政学(含:税收学)];
摘要
We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that the common auditor effect is more pronounced for deals with greater pre-acquisition uncertainty and deals involving acquirers and targets that are audited by the same local office of the common auditor. We also find that there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that common auditors act as information intermediaries for merging firms, resulting in higher quality acquisitions. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:77 / 99
页数:23
相关论文
共 85 条
[1]
Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains [J].
Aboody, D ;
Lev, B .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (06) :2747-2766
[2]
Common Advisers in Mergers and Acquisitions: Determinants and Consequences [J].
Agrawal, Anup ;
Cooper, Tommy ;
Lian, Qin ;
Wang, Qiming .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2013, 56 (03) :691-740
[3]
New evidence and perspectives on mergers [J].
Andrade, G ;
Mitchell, M ;
Stafford, E .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2001, 15 (02) :103-120
[4]
Anilowski C. L., 2009, WORKING PAPER
[5]
THE GAINS TO BIDDING FIRMS FROM MERGER [J].
ASQUITH, P ;
BRUNER, RF ;
MULLINS, DW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1983, 11 (1-4) :121-139
[6]
Externalities of public firm presence: Evidence from private firms' investment decisions [J].
Badertscher, Brad ;
Shroff, Nemit ;
White, Hal D. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2013, 109 (03) :682-706
[7]
Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable? [J].
Barth, Mary E. ;
Landsman, Wayne R. ;
Lang, Mark ;
Williams, Christopher .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2012, 54 (01) :68-93
[8]
Does Investment-Related Pressure Lead to Misreporting? An Analysis of Reporting Following M&A Transactions [J].
Bens, Daniel A. ;
Goodman, Theodore H. ;
Neamtiu, Monica .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2012, 87 (03) :839-865
[9]
COMMON MARKETING AGENCY AS A DEVICE FOR FACILITATING COLLUSION [J].
BERNHEIM, BD ;
WHINSTON, MD .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) :269-281
[10]
Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment [J].
Biddle, Gary C. ;
Hilary, Gilles .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2006, 81 (05) :963-982