Learning, productivity, and noise: an experimental study of cultural transmission on the Bolivian Altiplano

被引:41
作者
Efferson, Charles
Richerson, Peter J.
McElreath, Richard
Lubell, Mark
Edsten, Ed
Waring, Timothy M.
Paciotti, Brian
Baum, William
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Grad Grp Ecol, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Univ Calif Davis, Grad Grp Anim Behav, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[3] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Anthropol, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[4] Univ Calif Davis, Grad Grp Populat Biol, Davis, CA 95616 USA
关键词
cultural evolution; nonlinear dynamics; experimental games;
D O I
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.05.005
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The theory of cultural transmission distinguishes between biased and unbiased social learning. Biases simply mean that social learning is not completely random. The distinction is critical because biases produce effects at the aggregate level that then feed back to influence individual behavior. This study presents an economic experiment designed specifically to see if players use social information in a biased way. The experiment was conducted among a group of subsistence pastoralists in southern Bolivia. Treatments were designed to test for two widely discussed forms of biased social leaming: a tendency to imitate success and a tendency to follow the majority. The analysis, based primarily on fitting specific evolutionary models to the data using maximum likelihood, found neither a clear tendency to imitate success nor conformity. Players instead seemed to rely largely on private feedback about their own personal histories of choices and payoffs. Nonetheless, improved performance in one treatment provides evidence for some important but currently unspecified social effect. Given existing experimental work on cultural transmission from other societies, the current study suggests that social leaming is potentially conditional and culturally specific. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 17
页数:7
相关论文
共 40 条
[1]   Competition, imitation and growth with step-by-step innovation [J].
Aghion, P ;
Harris, C ;
Howitt, P ;
Vickers, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2001, 68 (03) :467-492
[2]  
Akaike H., 1973, 2 INT S INFORM THEOR, P267, DOI [DOI 10.1007/978-1-4612-1694-0_15, 10.1007/978-1-4612-1694-0_15]
[3]  
Barro R. J., 2003, Economic growth, V2nd
[4]   Cultural evolution in laboratory microsocieties including traditions of rule giving and rule following [J].
Baum, WM ;
Richerson, PJ ;
Efferson, CM ;
Paciotti, BM .
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 2004, 25 (05) :305-326
[5]  
BLUSKE RA, 2004, AREAS PROTEGIDAS DEP
[6]  
Bowles Samuel, 2004, ROUNDTABLE SER BEHAV
[7]   CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR [J].
BOYD, R ;
RICHERSON, PJ .
HUMAN ECOLOGY, 1982, 10 (03) :325-351
[8]  
Boyd R., 1988, CULTURE EVOLUTIONARY
[9]  
Boyd R., 2005, ORIGIN EVOLUTION CUL
[10]  
Burnham K.P., 2002, Model selection and multimodel inference: a practical information-theoretic approach, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4757-2917-7_3