Strategic analysis of electricity markets under uncertainty:: A conjectured-price-response approach

被引:56
作者
Centeno, Efraim [1 ]
Reneses, Javier [1 ]
Barquin, Julian [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pontificia Comaillas, Inst Invest Tecnol, Sch Engn, Madrid 28015, Spain
关键词
conjectural variation; electricity markets; game theory; hydroelectric-thermal power generation; quadratic programming (QP); stochastic programming;
D O I
10.1109/TPWRS.2006.887890
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper presents a model to address generation companies' medium-term strategic analysis (including yearly forecast and decision-making processes) based on a conjectured-price-response market equilibrium representation that assumes a single node system. This equilibrium is formulated by simultaneous consideration that any of the variables that affect price formation-such as hydro inflows, demand, or fuel prices-are stochastic, by representing them through a scenario tree. It is shown that this equilibrium formulation can be solved by means of an equivalent optimization problem, which in most common cases becomes, a quadratic programming problem. This schema enables taking advantage of the properties of classical medium-term operation optimization models, including clear model structure, reasonable computing solving time, and easy obtaining of dual-information. An annual study case (inspired by the Spanish electricity market) is presented, including two alternative demand levels in summer and three hydro-inflow situations, both in spring and autumn. In addition to the advantages previously mentioned, this approach provides richer results than a deterministic one, allowing companies to fit their policies more accurately to reality, thereby avoiding, for example, excessively optimistic or pessimistic decisions proposed by the deterministic analysis.
引用
收藏
页码:423 / 432
页数:10
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