Empathy leads to fairness

被引:96
作者
Page, KM
Nowak, MA
机构
[1] UCL, Dept Comp Sci, Bioinformat Unit, London WC1E 6BT, England
[2] Inst Adv Study, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/bulm.2002.0321
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In the Ultimatum Game, two players are asked to split a prize. The first player, the proposer, makes an offer of how to split the prize. The second player, the responder, either accepts the offer, in which case the prize is split as agreed, or rejects it, in which case neither player receives anything. The rational strategy suggested by classical game theory is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible positive share and for the responder to accept. Humans do not play this way, however, and instead tend to offer 50% of the prize and to reject offers below 20%. Here we study the Ultimatum Game in an evolutionary context and show that empathy can lead to the evolution of fairness. Empathy means that individuals make offers which they themselves would be prepared to accept. (C) 2002 Society for Mathematical Biology. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1101 / 1116
页数:16
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