Individual differences in deductive reasoning

被引:90
作者
Newstead, SE [1 ]
Handley, SJ [1 ]
Harley, C [1 ]
Wright, H [1 ]
Farrelly, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Plymouth, Dept Psychol, Ctr Thinking & Language, Plymouth PL4 8AA, Devon, England
来源
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY | 2004年 / 57卷 / 01期
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1080/02724980343000116
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Three studies are reported, which examined individual differences in deductive reasoning as a function of intellectual ability and thinking style. Intellectual ability was a good predictor of logical performance on syllogisms, especially where there was a conflict between logic and believability. However, in the first two experiments there was no link between ability and performance on indicative selection tasks, in sharp contrast to previous research. This correlation did, however, return in the final study. Our data are consistent with the claim that the correlation with logical accuracy on abstract selection tasks is found primarily with participants of relatively high ability. At lower levels, pragmatically cued responses are given but those of slightly higher ability divorce the rule from the scenario and respond consistently (though incorrectly) across problems. Self-report questionnaires were generally poor predictors of performance, but a measure of the ability to generate alternative representations proved an excellent predictor. These results are consistent with a mental models approach to reasoning and also have implications for the debate about human rationality.
引用
收藏
页码:33 / 60
页数:28
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