Revealed preference, belief, and game theory

被引：52

作者：

Hausman, DM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA

[2] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

来源：

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY | 2000年 / 16卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0266267100000158

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken. © 2000, Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：99 / 115

页数：17

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