Litigation, experimentation, and reputation

被引：10

作者：

Yang, BZ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] FLINDERS UNIV S AUSTRALIA,ADELAIDE,SA 5001,AUSTRALIA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 16卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00041-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper develops a multiple-plaintiff game with a correlation across plaintiffs' private information (damage levels). It argues that the defendant engages in experimentation to learn (or remain uninformed about) the plaintiffs' types and play tougher (or softer) in the initial case when another party may also have an interest in the suit. (C) 1996 by Elsevier Science Inc.

引用

页码：491 / 502

页数：12

共 29 条

[1] OPTIMAL LEARNING BY EXPERIMENTATION
AGHION, P
BOLTON, P
HARRIS, C
JULLIEN, B
[J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1991, 58 (04) : 621 - 654
[2] LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
BEBCHUK, LA
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (03) : 404 - 415
[3] BLUME A, 1992, SETTLEMENT LITIGATIO
[4] CHE YK, 1993, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V9, P399
[5] CHE YK, 1992, EC COLLECTIVE NEGOTI
[6] COOTER RD, 1989, J ECON LIT, V27, P1067
[7] DAUGHETY AF, 1993, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V9, P314
[8] DAUGHETY AF, 1994, RAND J ECON, V26, P203
[9] FORMAN JL, 1987, W MITCHELL LAW REV, V15, P505
[10] REPUTATION IN THE SIMULTANEOUS PLAY OF MULTIPLE OPPONENTS
FUDENBERG, D
KREPS, DM
[J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1987, 54 (04) : 541 - 568

← 1 2 3 →