Efficient search and recruiting: Choosing sides in matching games

被引：1

作者：

Kennes, J

机构：

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1997年 / 54卷 / 01期

关键词：

choosing sides; efficiency; increasing returns; job matching;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00905-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper looks for sharing rules which implement efficient allocations in a simple matching game. It is shown that efficiency is possible even if the matching technology does not display constant returns to scale.

引用

页码：59 / 63

页数：5

共 5 条

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