Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth

被引:68
作者
Durnev, Art [1 ]
Errunza, Vihang [1 ]
Molchanov, Alexander [2 ]
机构
[1] McGill Univ, Desautels Fac Management, Montreal, PQ H3A 1G5, Canada
[2] Massey Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Auckland, New Zealand
关键词
corporate governance; political risk; business performance; financial and industrial structure; DISCLOSURE; MARKETS; FIRMS; ENVIRONMENT; GOVERNANCE; COUNTRIES; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1057/jibs.2009.58
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In countries with secure property rights, corporate transparency improves investment efficiency and increases growth by alleviating information asymmetry. However, in countries with insecure property rights, greater transparency can increase the risk of government expropriation. Therefore some firms that would benefit most from transparency cannot take full advantage of it, as they set sub-optimal transparency levels. Using data from 59 industries in 69 countries, we find that in countries with weak property rights protection, industries that would benefit the most from transparency exhibit worse investment efficiency and grow more slowly than industries that can efficiently operate at minimal levels of transparency. Journal of International Business Studies (2009) 40, 1533-1562. doi: 10.1057/jibs.2009.58
引用
收藏
页码:1533 / 1562
页数:30
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