Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

被引:62
作者
Blum, Y [1 ]
Roth, AE [1 ]
Rothblum, UG [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV PITTSBURGH,DEPT ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1997.2307
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In contrast to entry-level professional labor markets, in which cohorts of candidates and positions become available at the same time (e.g., when candidates graduate from school), senior level positions typically become available when an incumbent retires, or a new position is created, and when a senior position is filled a new vacancy is often created elsewhere. We model senior level labor markets as two-sided matching markets in which matchings are destabilized by retirements and new entries, and can return to stability by a decentralized process of offers and acceptances. This generalizes the standard analysis in a way which has points of contact with the sociological literature on vacancy chains. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:362 / 411
页数:50
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