Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives

被引:795
作者
Qian, YY
Weingast, BR
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
[2] Hoover Institution, Ward C. Krebs Fam. Dept. Polit. Sci., Stanford University, Stanford, CA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.11.4.83
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism-decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition-help provide credible commitment or these purposes. In addition, the authors suggest that some federalism are self-sustaining.
引用
收藏
页码:83 / 92
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
[1]   Formal and real authority in organizations [J].
Aghion, P ;
Tirole, J .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1997, 105 (01) :1-29
[2]  
Bednar, 1997, POLITICAL THEORY FED
[3]  
Bednar Jenna, 1997, C LAW EC FED U MINN
[4]  
Brennan G., 1980, POWER TAX
[5]  
Buchanan J.M., 1962, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Fundations of Constitutional Democracy
[6]  
BUCHANAN JM, 1995, PUBLIUS J FEDERALISM, V25, P19
[7]  
CHE J, 1997, IN PRESS J LAW EC OR
[8]   The Nature of the Firm [J].
Coase, R. H. .
ECONOMICA-NEW SERIES, 1937, 4 (16) :386-405
[9]   ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF TAX LIMITATION [J].
COURANT, PN ;
RUBINFELD, DL .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1981, 16 (03) :289-316
[10]  
DEFIGUEIREDO RJ, 1997, UNPUB SELF ENFORCING