Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism

被引：255

作者：

Johnson, S

Kaufmann, D

McMillan, J

Woodruff, C

机构：

[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA

[3] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[4] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 76卷 / 03期

关键词：

corruption; taxation; legal system; unofficial economy;

D O I：

10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00094-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden 'unofficial' activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. A comparison of cross-country averages shows that managers in Russia and Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：495 / 520

页数：26

共 34 条

[1] Andreoni J, 1998, J ECON LIT, V36, P818
[2] De Soto Hernando, 1989, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism
[3] *EBRD, 1997, TRANSP REP
[4] *EBRD, 1996, TRANSP REP
[5] *EBRD, 1995, TRANSP REP
[6] Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries
Friedman, E
Johnson, S
Kaufmann, D
Zoido-Lobaton, P
[J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2000, 76 (03) : 459 - 493
[7] Frye T, 1997, AM ECON REV, V87, P354
[8] GUSTAFSON T, 1999, IN PRESS CAPITALISM
[9] *IMD, 1998, WORLD COMP YB
[10] JOHNSON B, 1997, INDEX EC FREEDOM 199

← 1 2 3 4 →