A signaling model of peaceful political change

被引:4
作者
Gavious, A
Mizrahi, S
机构
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Sch Ind Engn & Management, Fac Engn Sci, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Sch Management, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s003550200171
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The interaction between social activists and politicians is modeled by a signaling game in which activists send messages and politicians interpret them, attempting to understand the activists' goals. These goals range between extreme radical and very moderate changes that activists wish to achieve in policy or in the political system. The formal model shows the conditions for equilibrium with separating and pooling regions dependent on the type of social activists and the demands they raise. In the pooling region an activist who wants to achieve a certain degree of radical change sends a false signal, thus possibly leading politicians to enter negotiations under unfavorable conditions. This creates a momentum of peaceful political change.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 136
页数:18
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