Information and Enforcement in Informal Credit Markets

被引:45
作者
Ghosh, Parikshit [1 ]
Ray, Debraj [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Delhi Sch Econ, New Delhi, India
[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
[3] Univ Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; IMPERFECT INFORMATION; FIELD EXPERIMENT; COMMITMENT; MICROFINANCE; COOPERATION; INCENTIVES; REPUTATION; ECONOMIES;
D O I
10.1111/ecca.12169
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要
We study loan enforcement in informal credit markets with multiple lenders but no sharing of credit histories, and derive the dynamics of loan size and interest rates for relational lending. In the presence of a sufficient fraction of 'natural defaulters', the rest of the market can be incentivized against default by micro-rationing-sharper credit limits and possibly higher interest rates that serve as gateways into new borrowing relationships. When there are too few natural defaulters in the market, this can be supplemented by macro-rationing-random exclusion of some borrowers. When information collection is endogenized, multiple equilibria may arise.
引用
收藏
页码:59 / 90
页数:32
相关论文
共 58 条
[1]
Aleem I., 1993, The economics of rural organization: theory, practice, and policy., P131
[2]
Antras P., 2015, J POLITICAL EC, V123, P809
[3]
Ausubel Lawrence M., 1999, Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market
[4]
Banerjee A., 2004, DO FIRMS WANT UNPUB
[5]
THY NEIGHBORS KEEPER - THE DESIGN OF A CREDIT COOPERATIVE WITH THEORY AND A TEST [J].
BANERJEE, AV ;
BESLEY, T ;
GUINNANE, TW .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (02) :491-515
[6]
Bell C., 1993, The economics of rural organization: theory, practice, and policy., P186
[7]
BENDOR J, 1990, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V6, P33
[8]
GROUP LENDING, REPAYMENT INCENTIVES AND SOCIAL COLLATERAL [J].
BESLEY, T ;
COATE, S .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 1995, 46 (01) :1-18
[9]
BESLEY T., 2012, Q J ECON, V127, P1
[10]
Group lending and individual lending with strategic default [J].
Bhole, Bharat ;
Ogden, Sean .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2010, 91 (02) :348-363