The evolution of Walrasian behavior

被引：274

作者：

VegaRedondo, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ALICANTE,INST VALENCIANO INVEST ECON,ALICANTE 03071,SPAIN

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1997年 / 65卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2171898

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：375 / 384

页数：10

共 21 条

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