Federal terrorism risk insurance

被引:8
作者
Brown, JR [1 ]
Kroszner, RS
Jenn, BH
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Finance, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
[2] Council Econ Advisors, Washington, DC 20502 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.17310/ntj.2002.3.13
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an important public policy question arose as to whether, and how, the federal government should intervene to provide a temporary backstop for property/casualty terrorism risk insurance. This paper examines several economic justifications for intervention and the rationale behind the Administration's proposal for a temporary and limited government program.
引用
收藏
页码:647 / 657
页数:11
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