A comparison of Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for power markets

被引：58

作者：

Krause, T.

Beck, E. V.

Cherkaoui, R.

Germond, A.

Andersson, G.

Ernst, D.

机构：

[1] ETH, EEH Power Syst Lab, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland

[2] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, LRE, STI, Stn 11, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

[3] Univ Liege, Inst Montefiore, B-4020 Liege, Belgium

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS | 2006年 / 28卷 / 09期

关键词：

electricity market modelling; game theory; reinforcement learning;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijepes.2006.03.002

中图分类号：

TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];

学科分类号：

0808 ; 0809 ;

摘要：

In this paper we compare Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for assessing the market dynamics of network-constrained pool markets. Power suppliers submit their bids to the market place in order to maximize their payoffs, where we apply reinforcement learning as a behavioral agent model. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational marginal pricing scheme. Simulations are carried out on a benchmark power system. We show how the evolution of the agent-based approach relates to the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium or multiple equilibria in the system. Additionally, the parameter sensitivity of the results is discussed. (C) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：599 / 607

页数：9

共 13 条

[1]

[Anonymous], INTRO DYNAMIC GAMES

[2] Agent-based simulation - An application to the new electricity trading arrangements of England and Wales [J].