Self-reinforcing market dominance

被引:6
作者
Halbheer, Daniel [2 ]
Fehr, Ernst [1 ]
Goette, Lorenz [3 ]
Schmutzler, Armin [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empir Res Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Univ Zurich, Inst Strategy & Business Econ, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Geneva, Dept Econ, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland
[4] Univ Zurich, Socioecon Inst, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
Cost-reducing investment; Asymmetric oligopoly; Increasing dominance; Experimental study; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS; DUOPOLY; COOPERATION; MODEL; RATIONALITY; ASYMMETRY; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR; INDUSTRY;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要
Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:481 / 502
页数:22
相关论文
共 42 条
[1]
Competition, imitation and growth with step-by-step innovation [J].
Aghion, P ;
Harris, C ;
Howitt, P ;
Vickers, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2001, 68 (03) :467-492
[2]
[Anonymous], 2006, HDB EC GIVING ALTRUI
[3]
[Anonymous], MOL GEN MIKROBIOL VI
[4]
Investment and market dominance [J].
Athey, S ;
Schmutzler, A .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 32 (01) :1-26
[5]
Small scale entry versus acquisitions of small firms: Is concentration self-reinforcing? [J].
Aydemir, Zava ;
Schmutzler, Armin .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2008, 65 (01) :133-146
[6]
STRATEGIC COMMITMENT WITH R-AND-D - THE SYMMETRIC CASE [J].
BRANDER, JA ;
SPENCER, BJ .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01) :225-235
[7]
A MODEL OF THE EVOLUTION OF DUOPOLY - DOES THE ASYMMETRY BETWEEN FIRMS TEND TO INCREASE OR DECREASE [J].
BUDD, C ;
HARRIS, C ;
VICKERS, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1993, 60 (03) :543-573
[8]
THE LEARNING-CURVE, MARKET DOMINANCE, AND PREDATORY PRICING [J].
CABRAL, LMB ;
RIORDAN, MH .
ECONOMETRICA, 1994, 62 (05) :1115-1140
[9]
Revealed altruism [J].
Cox, James C. ;
Friedman, Daniel ;
Sadiraj, Vjollca .
ECONOMETRICA, 2008, 76 (01) :31-69
[10]
A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness [J].
Cox, James C. ;
Friedman, Daniel ;
Gjerstad, Steven .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2007, 59 (01) :17-45