Agents with and without principals

被引：88

作者：

Bertrand, M

Mullainathan, S

机构：

[1] NBER, New York, NY USA

[2] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.90.2.203

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：203 / 208

页数：6

共 6 条

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[6] LARGE SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE-CONTROL
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