Contagious bank failures in a free banking system

被引：34

作者：

Aghion, P

Bolton, P

Dewatripont, M

机构：

[1] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England

[2] EBRD, London, England

[3] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London SW1Y 6LA, England

[4] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

[5] Free Univ Brussels, ECARE, Brussels, Belgium

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 44卷 / 4-6期

关键词：

contagious bank runs; systemic risk; moral hazard; insolvency; liquidity shortage; regulations; clearing house;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00058-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper develops a model of an unregulated banking system based around a private clearing house arrangement. Whilst such a system may dominate one with a public safety net in reducing moral hazard in lending and therefore the scope for individual bank insolvency, it also increases the likelihood of contagious bank failures following a systemic shock or an aggregate liquidity shortage. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D00; G3.

引用

页码：713 / 718

页数：6