What makes markets allocationally efficient?

被引：77

作者：

Gode, DK ^{[1
]}

Sunder, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV,GRAD SCH IND ADM,PITTSBURGH,PA 15213

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1997年 / 112卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/003355397555307

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

What determines the allocative efficiency of markets? Why are double auctions, even with untrained human traders, allocationally efficient? We provide a simple explanation for these complex phenomena by showing how externally observable rules that define a market cause high allocative efficiency when individuals remain within the confines of these rules. We also show how the oft-ignored shape of extramarginal demand and supply affects efficiency by influencing the inverse relationship between the magnitude of efficiency loss and its probability.

引用

页码：603 / 630

页数：28

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