The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

被引：49

作者：

Angelopoulos, Konstantinos ^{[2
]}

Philippopoulos, Apostolis ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Vassilatos, Vanghelis ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Athens Univ Econ & Business, Dept Econ, Athens, Greece

[2] Univ Glasgow, Dept Econ, Glasgow, Lanark, Scotland

[3] CESifo, Munich, Germany

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2009年 / 25卷 / 03期

关键词：

Rent seeking; Rent extraction; Privilege; Taxation; Public spending; FISCAL-POLICY; CORRUPTION; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.06.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980-2003, performs well vis-a-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：280 / 299

页数：20

共 34 条

[1] [Anonymous], EUROPEAN J POLITICAL
[2] [Anonymous], 2003, PUBLIC CHOICE
[3] Baik K.H., 2007, Eur. J. Pol. Eco., V23, P768
[4] BAXTER M, 1993, AM ECON REV, V83, P315
[5] Burnside C, 1996, AM ECON REV, V86, P1154
[6] Heterogeneity and aggregation: Implications for labor-market fluctuations
Chang, Yongsung
Kim, Sun-Bin
[J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (05) : 1939 - 1956
[7] Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods
Cheikbossian, Guillaume
[J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2008, 24 (01) : 133 - 150
[8] CHRISTIANO LJ, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P430
[9] Congleton R.D., 2008, 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking, VII
[10] Congleton Roger D., 2008, The Theory of Rent Seeking: Forty Years of Research, V1, P1, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9

← 1 2 3 4 →