Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly*

被引:27
作者
Auriol, Emmanuelle [1 ]
Picard, Pierre M. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toulouse 1, TSE ARQADE & IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France
[2] Univ Luxembourg, CREA, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
[3] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, Louvain, Belgium
关键词
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; MARKET; COST;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02291.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds laLaffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However the government can contract ex post with the private firms. This ex post contracting set-up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties.
引用
收藏
页码:1464 / 1493
页数:30
相关论文
共 39 条