Stimulating Local Public Employment:Do General Grants Work?

被引：23

作者：

Lundqvist, Helene ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Dahlberg, Matz ^{[3
,4
,5
,6
]}

Mork, Eva ^{[3
,5
,7
]}

机构：

[1] Stockholm Univ, Dept Econ, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

[2] UCFS, CESifo, Uppsala, Sweden

[3] UCLS, Uppsala, Sweden

[4] Uppsala Univ, Inst Housing & Urban Res IBF, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden

[5] Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden

[6] UCFS, Inst Evaluat Labour Market & Educ Policy IFAU, CESifo, IEB, Uppsala, Sweden

[7] UCFS, CESifo, IEB, Inst Study Labor IZA, Uppsala, Sweden

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY | 2014年 / 6卷 / 01期

关键词：

FEDERAL-GRANTS; BUREAUCRATS; RULE; AID;

D O I：

10.1257/pol.6.1.167

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

020101 [政治经济学];

摘要：

We apply the regression kink design to the Swedish grant system and estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on local public employment. Our robust conclusion is that grants do not stimulate local public employment. We find no statistically significant effects on total local public employment, and we can exclude even moderate effects. When disaggregating the total effect by sector, we find that personnel in the traditional welfare sectors are unaffected, a conclusion which applies to both publicly and privately employed in these sectors. The only positive and statistically significant effect of grants is that on administrative personnel.

引用

页码：167 / 192

页数：26

共 39 条

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Bureaucrats or politicians? Part I: A single policy task [J].