Networks and productivity: Causal evidence from editor rotations

被引:96
作者
Brogaard, Jonathan [1 ]
Engelberg, Joseph [2 ]
Parsons, Christopher A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98105 USA
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
关键词
Editor networks; Citations; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using detailed publication and citation data for over 50,000 articles from 30 major economics and finance journals, we investigate whether network proximity to an editor influences research productivity. During an editor's tenure, his current university colleagues publish about 100% more papers in the editor's journal, compared to years when he is not editor. In contrast to editorial nepotism, such "inside" articles have significantly higher ex post citation counts, even when same-journal and self-cites are excluded. Our results thus suggest that despite potential conflicts of interest faced by editors, personal associations are used to improve selection decisions. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 270
页数:20
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