A comment on: "Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs"

被引:13
作者
Anderson, ET
Kumar, N
Rajiv, S
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Univ Texas, Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75083 USA
[3] Natl Univ Singapore, Sch Business, Singapore 117592, Singapore
关键词
pricing; duopoly; switching costs;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this note, we prove that the equilibrium proposed by Padilla [2, Theorem 1] is not an equilibrium for c<c*. We then characterize a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for all values of c and show that findings on the sustainability of tacit collusion [2, Theorem 3] are unchanged for this MPE. We further show that neither the equilibrium proposed by Padilla nor our MPE is an equilibrium if consumers are forward looking.
引用
收藏
页码:177 / 186
页数:10
相关论文
共 2 条
[1]  
ANDERSON ET, 1995, ESSAYS PRICING ADVER
[2]   Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs [J].
Padilla, AJ .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1995, 67 (02) :520-530