Population growth and technological change in a global warming model

被引：24

作者：

Dutta, Prajit K. ^{[1
]}

Radner, Roy

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10025 USA

[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2006年 / 29卷 / 02期

关键词：

global warming; population growth; dynamic game; subgame perfect equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-005-0056-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Global warming (GW) is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. After providing some introductory background material, we introduce a benchmark dynamic game within which to study the GW problem. The model allows for population growth and is subsequently generalized to allow for changes in technology. In each case, a benchmark "Business as Usual" (BAU) equilibrium is analyzed and contrasted with the efficient solution. Furthermore, a complete characterization is provided in the benchmark model of the entire subgame perfect equilibrium value correspondence.

引用

页码：251 / 270

页数：20

共 13 条

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