Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

被引：30

作者：

George, K ^{[1
]}

LaManna, MMA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ST ANDREWS,DEPT ECON,ST ANDREWS KY16 9AL,FIFE,SCOTLAND

来源：

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1996年 / 11卷 / 06期

关键词：

mixed oligopoly; public ownership; privatization;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00174411

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''small''.

引用

页码：853 / 860

页数：8

共 6 条

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