We characterize and compare equilibrium pricing strategies in a marketing channel in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices of the two versions of a product, i.e., tangible and digital. and the retailer their prices to consumer. In the second scenario, the players use a revenue-sharing contract for only the digital version, while the competing version is managed by a wholesale price contract. The problem is inspired from a pricing controversy in the e-book industry. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Mississippi, University, MS 38677 USA
Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Mississippi, University, MS 38677 USA
机构:
Univ Mississippi, University, MS 38677 USA
Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Mississippi, University, MS 38677 USA