Foreign policy substitutability and internal economic problems in enduring rivalries

The authors advance a general perspective on how to incorporate the notion of foreign policy substitutability in probabilistic models of international politics. They suggest that substitutability may be dealt with in one of two ways, namely, (1) through better specification or (2) through the use of multinomial legit analysis techniques. Their solution is applied to the substantive problem of how internal economic conditions affect the behavior of states in enduring rivalries. States in rivalries might react to worsening economic problems by either (1) escalating conflict within the rivalry to gain the benefits of a diversionary conflict or (2) seeking to settle the rivalry to free up resources that can be directed toward dealing with economic problems. The possibility that seemingly contradictory policies may be undertaken requires the use of a model for analysis that takes into account substitutability. The authors perform empirical analysis to determine how economic conditions may simultaneously affect the probabilities of dispute initiation and rivalry termination.