Board characteristics and audit fees

被引:122
作者
Carcello, JV [1 ]
Hermanson, DR
Neal, TL
Riley, RA
机构
[1] Univ Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
[2] Univ Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
[3] W Virginia Univ, Morgantown, WV 26506 USA
关键词
audit fees; board characteristics; expertise; independence;
D O I
10.1092/CHWK-GMQ0-MLKE-K03V
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee "quality" are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees.
引用
收藏
页码:365 / 384
页数:20
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