The administrative monopoly in China's economic transition

被引:19
作者
Guo, Y
Hu, AG
机构
[1] Tsinghua Univ, Ctr China Study, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[2] Tsinghua Univ, Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
关键词
administrative monopoly; corruption; China; economic transition; gradual transition;
D O I
10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.03.005
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Corruption in transition economies has become the very focus of many recent discussions on politics and economics. However, the existing research has not taken full account of the experience of the gradual transition countries, especially China, and the incentives for rent creation in the transition process. Based on existing studies in this field, this paper addresses a new category of corruption in transition economies. In the context of the rent seeking theory, the authors examine what they regard as a unique type of corruption in China-administrative monopoly (AM), and outline its essence, causes, forms, features, the scale of the rent created, and the dissipation of the rent. (C) 2004 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:265 / 280
页数:16
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