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Gossip and Ostracism Promote Cooperation in Groups
被引:299
作者:
Feinberg, Matthew
[1
,2
]
Willer, Robb
[3
]
Schultz, Michael
[4
]
机构:
[1] Stanford Univ, Ctr Compass & Altruism Res & Educ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Dept Sociol, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Sociol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
基金:
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词:
gossip;
social behavior;
reputation;
social interaction;
cooperation;
partner choice;
social dilemmas;
altruism;
ostracism;
punishment;
SOCIAL DILEMMAS;
COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM;
INDIRECT RECIPROCITY;
SANCTIONING SYSTEMS;
BIOLOGICAL MARKETS;
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR;
HUMANS;
EXCLUSION;
PUNISHMENT;
REPUTATION;
D O I:
10.1177/0956797613510184
中图分类号:
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号:
04 ;
0402 ;
摘要:
The widespread existence of cooperation is difficult to explain because individuals face strong incentives to exploit the cooperative tendencies of others. In the research reported here, we examined how the spread of reputational information through gossip promotes cooperation in mixed-motive settings. Results showed that individuals readily communicated reputational information about others, and recipients used this information to selectively interact with cooperative individuals and ostracize those who had behaved selfishly, which enabled group members to contribute to the public good with reduced threat of exploitation. Additionally, ostracized individuals responded to exclusion by subsequently cooperating at levels comparable to those who were not ostracized. These results suggest that the spread of reputational information through gossip can mitigate egoistic behavior by facilitating partner selection, thereby helping to solve the problem of cooperation even in noniterated interactions.
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页码:656 / 664
页数:9
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