The priority heuristic:: Making choices without trade-offs

被引:453
作者
Brandstätter, E
Gigerenzer, G
Hertwig, R
机构
[1] Johannes Kepler Univ Linz, Dept Psychol, A-4040 Linz, Austria
[2] Univ Basel, Fac Psychol, Basel, Switzerland
[3] Max Planck Inst Human Dev & Educ, Ctr Adapt Behav & Cognit, D-1000 Berlin, Germany
关键词
risky choice; heuristics; decision making; frugality; choice process;
D O I
10.1037/0033-295X.113.2.409
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, the authors generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority, heuristic predicts (a) the Allais paradox, (b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (c) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., lottery tickets), (d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (e.g., buying insurance), (e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (f) the certainty effect, (g) the possibility effect, and (h) intransitivities. The authors test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared with previously proposed heuristics and 3 modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.
引用
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页码:409 / 432
页数:24
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