Three's a crowd - Third parties and WTO dispute settlement

被引:83
作者
Busch, Marc L. [1 ]
Reinhardt, Eric
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, Sch Foreign Serv, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[2] Georgetown Univ, Dept Govt, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[3] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1353/wp.2007.0000
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Consistent with the authors' argument, they find that third-party participation lowers the prospects for early settlement. Controlling for this selection effect, the evidence also suggests that third-party support increases the chances of a legal victory at the WTO.
引用
收藏
页码:446 / +
页数:33
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