Understanding the Penalties Associated with Corporate Misconduct: An Empirical Examination of Earnings and Risk

被引:145
作者
Murphy, Deborah L. [1 ]
Shrieves, Ronald E. [1 ]
Tibbs, Samuel L. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tennessee, Coll Business Adm, Stokely Management Ctr, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
[2] E Carolina Univ, Coll Business, Greenville, NC 27858 USA
关键词
HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS; REPUTATIONAL PENALTY; MARKET EQUILIBRIUM; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; FRAUD; FIRMS; COST;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109009090036
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the relationship between allegations of corporate misconduct and changes in profitability and risk of the alleged offender. Profitability is measured as reported earnings and analysts' earnings forecasts. Risk is measured as stock return volatility and concordance among analysts' forecasts. Decreases in earnings and increases in risk are found to accompany allegations of misconduct, and although the results are somewhat sensitive to the earnings and risk metrics used, the changes are found to be consistently greater for related-party offenses. The importance of reputational penalties is underscored by analysis of the association between allegation-related changes in firm value and changes in earnings and risk.
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 83
页数:29
相关论文
共 19 条
[1]   On the nature of the reputational penalty for corporate crime: Evidence [J].
Alexander, CR .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1999, 42 (01) :489-526
[2]   Do heterogeneous beliefs matter for asset pricing? [J].
Anderson, EW ;
Ghysels, E ;
Juergens, JL .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2005, 18 (03) :875-924
[3]   Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics [J].
Barber, BM ;
Lyon, JD .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1996, 41 (03) :359-399
[4]   DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION AND SECURITY MARKET EQUILIBRIUM [J].
BARRY, CB ;
BROWN, SJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1985, 20 (04) :407-422
[5]   USING DAILY STOCK RETURNS - THE CASE OF EVENT STUDIES [J].
BROWN, SJ ;
WARNER, JB .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 14 (01) :3-31
[6]   PERFORMANCE CHANGES FOLLOWING TOP MANAGEMENT DISMISSALS [J].
DENIS, DJ ;
DENIS, DK .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1995, 50 (04) :1029-1057
[7]   INTERTEMPORAL ASSET PRICING WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS [J].
DETEMPLE, J ;
MURTHY, S .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1994, 62 (02) :294-320
[8]   Information and the cost of capital [J].
Easley, D ;
O'Hara, M .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2004, 59 (04) :1553-1583
[9]   Managerial succession and firm performance [J].
Huson, MR ;
Malatesta, PH ;
Parrino, R .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2004, 74 (02) :237-275
[10]   THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT RECALLS ON THE WEALTH OF SELLERS [J].
JARRELL, G ;
PELTZMAN, S .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (03) :512-536