A Post Keynesian theory of decision making under uncertainty

被引:30
作者
Fontana, G [1 ]
Gerrard, B
机构
[1] Univ Leeds, Sch Business, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England
[2] Univ Missouri, CFEPS, Kansas City, MO 64110 USA
关键词
uncertainty; decision-making; Post Keynesian economics;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2003.11.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The basic proposition of this paper is that Keynes's analysis of uncertainty has continuing relevance as a contribution to economic theory and decision theory. Keynes's original analysis and its subsequent development by Post Keynesians can provide the foundations for a more general theory of decision-making under uncertainty. Keynes's analysis can be extended to encompass both orthodox risk-based theories such as subjective expected utility theory as well as recent non-risk-based research on ambiguity and the heuristics and biases approach of Tversky and Kahneman. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:619 / 637
页数:19
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