Contract-intensive money: Contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance

被引:177
作者
Clague, C [1 ]
Keefer, P
Knack, S
Olson, M
机构
[1] San Diego State Univ, Dept Econ, San Diego, CA 92182 USA
[2] World Bank, Dev Res Grp, Washington, DC USA
[3] Univ Maryland, IRIS, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[4] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
contract enforcement; property rights; governance; economic growth;
D O I
10.1023/A:1009854405184
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called "contract-intensive money" or CIM, is based on citizens' decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.
引用
收藏
页码:185 / 211
页数:27
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