Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities

被引：10

作者：

Asseburg, Holger ^{[2
]}

Hofmann, Christian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Business Adm & Managerial Accounting, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

[2] Univ Tubingen, D-72074 Tubingen, Germany

来源：

OR SPECTRUM | 2010年 / 32卷 / 01期

关键词：

Contract externalities; Managerial incentives; Product market competition; Relative performance evaluation; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; OBSERVABILITY; MANAGEMENT; TRADE; RISK; PAY;

D O I：

10.1007/s00291-008-0132-9

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We consider the incentive characteristics of optimal linear contracts based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) for managers under moral hazard in imperfectly competitive product markets. Each contract influences the quantity choices of all competing agents causing contract externalities that affect the principals' contracting game. We analyze the relations between the optimal extent of RPE and several firm and market characteristics, allowing for heterogeneous firms and idiosyncratic firm risk. In general, we find non-monotonic comparative static results regarding the influence of market and firm-specific risk, the industry's competitiveness, and the correlation of the firms' profit.

引用

页码：1 / 20

页数：20

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