Political institutions and economic volatility

被引:104
作者
Klomp, Jeroen [1 ]
de Haan, Jakob [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Groningen, Fac Econ & Business, NL-9700 AV Groningen, Netherlands
[2] CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
Economic volatility; Political regime; Dynamic panel model; GROWTH VOLATILITY; INCOME INEQUALITY; PANEL-DATA; DEMOCRACY; INSTABILITY; COMPONENTS; OPENNESS; NUMBER; STATES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.02.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the effect of political 'institutions' on economic growth volatility, using data from more than 100 countries over the period 1960 to 2005, taking into account various control variables as suggested in previous studies. Our indicator of volatility is the relative standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The results of a dynamic panel model indicate that democracy reduces economic volatility. We also find that some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase economic volatility. (C) 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:311 / 326
页数:16
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