Purdah-On the Rationale for Central Bank Silence around Policy Meetings

被引:31
作者
Ehrmann, Michael [1 ]
Fratzscher, Marcel [1 ]
机构
[1] European Cent Bank, Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
E43; E52; E58; purdah; communication; transparency; monetary policy; interest rates; effectiveness; Federal Reserve; SOCIAL VALUE; COMMUNICATION;
D O I
10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00219.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Many central banks share the practice of purdah, a guideline of abstaining from communication around policy meetings. Although seemingly contradicting the virtue of transparency by withholding information precisely when it is sought after intensely, it has been justified on grounds that such communication may create excessive market volatility. This paper assesses the purdah for the Federal Reserve and confirms that financial markets are substantially more sensitive to central bank communication around policy meetings. Short-term interest rates react three to four times more strongly in the purdah before Federal Open Market Committee meetings than otherwise, and volatility increases (compared to a reduction otherwise).
引用
收藏
页码:517 / 528
页数:12
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