The two faces of learning by cooperating: The evolution and stability of inter-firm agreements in the European electronics industry

被引:21
作者
Bureth, A [1 ]
Wolff, S [1 ]
Zanfei, A [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV BOCCONI,IEFE,ISE,UNIV URBINO,MILAN,ITALY
关键词
learning; commitment; transitory coordination; collective assets; management of uncertainty;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00009-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using evidence from case studies, we try to emphasize that the decision to continue or discontinue an agreement will depend on the balance between the allocation, use and generation of re-deployable information that guarantees flexibility, and the allocation, use and creation of specific assets that will favour inertia of collaborative ventures. Thereafter, considering the stability of collaborations, the break up of an agreement can either be caused by a failure of the venture or by the attainment of satisfactory results from it, given the (irreversible and reversible) investments sustained. Conversely, while continuity of cooperation in time may signal a successful and self-sustaining interaction, it can also reflect lock-in phenomena.
引用
收藏
页码:519 / 537
页数:19
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