Costly punishment across human societies

被引:972
作者
Henrich, Joseph
McElreath, Richard
Barr, Abigail
Ensminger, Jean
Barrett, Clark
Bolyanatz, Alexander
Camilo Cardenas, Juan
Gurven, Michael
Gwako, Edwins
Henrich, Natalie
Lesorogol, Carolyn
Marlowe, Frank W.
Tracer, David
Ziker, John
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Dept Anthropol, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Anthropol, Grad Grp Ecol, Anim Behav Grad Grp,Populat Biol Grad Grp, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[3] Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, GPRG, Oxford OX1 3UQ, England
[4] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[5] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Anthropol, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[6] Coll DuPage, Dept Anthropol, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 USA
[7] Univ Los Andes, CEDE, Fac Econ, Bogota, Colombia
[8] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Anthropol, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[9] Guilford Coll, Dept Sociol & Anthropol, Greensboro, NC 27410 USA
[10] Washington Univ, George Warren Brown Sch Social Work, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
[11] Harvard Univ, Dept Anthropol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[12] Univ Colorado, Dept Anthropol, Denver, CO 80217 USA
[13] Univ Colorado, Hlth Sci Ctr, Denver, CO 80217 USA
[14] Boise State Univ, Dept Anthropol, Boise, ID 83725 USA
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; ULTIMATUM GAME; NEURAL BASIS; COOPERATION; FAIRNESS; NORMS; PERSPECTIVE; ENFORCEMENT; RECIPROCITY; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1126/science.1127333
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
引用
收藏
页码:1767 / 1770
页数:4
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